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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-
4-103(2)0 (Rev. 2008). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Plaintiff/appellant, Asael Fair & Sons Company ("Fair") did not seek summary 
judgment against defendants/appellees, Stephen D. Kirchen ("Kirchen"), Central Bonds 
& Insurance Agency, Inc. and Central Bonds & Insurance Company Incorporated 
(collectively "Central Bonds"). (Record ("R.") 1384-1393) Accordingly, the only issue 
on appeal involving Central Bonds is whether the district court properly granted Central 
Bonds' Motion for Summary Judgment (the "Motion"). (R. 2979-81). Central Bonds 
preserved the arguments supporting its Motion at R. 2982-3006 and R. 3447-3486. Fair's 
opposition to the Motion is preserved at R. 3181-89. 
A party such as Fair opposing a properly supported motion for summary 
judgment, and who has the burden of proof at trial, may not rest upon the mere 
allegations or denials of its pleading. The non-moving party, by affidavits or other 
competent evidence, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for 
trial. See Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, fs 16, 18, 177 P.3d 600. 
In an earlier decision the Utah Supreme Court provided a more expansive 
discussion of the burdens at the summary judgment phase on a non-moving party that 
will have the burden at trial: 
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[0]nce the moving party has brought forth evidence either tending to prove 
a lack of genuine issue of material fact or challenging the existence of one 
of the elements of the cause of action, the nonmoving party then bears the 
burden of providing some evidence, by affidavit or otherwise, in support of 
the essential elements of [its] claim. Id. 
Jensen v. IHCHospitals, Inc., 944 P.2d 327, 339 (Utah 1997) (citation omitted). 
Similarly, 
To successfully defend against a motion for summary judgment, the 
nonmoving party must set forth facts sufficient to establish the existence of 
an element essential to that party's case. Failure to do so with regard to any 
of the essential elements of that party's claim will result in a conclusion that 
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. In such a 
situation, there can be no genuine issue as to any material fact, since a 
complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving 
party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial. 
Anderson Dev. Co. v. Tobias, 2005 UT 36, ^ 23, 116 P.3d 323 (emphasis added). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES. 
ORDINANCES AND RULES 
None. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE 
Farr manufactures, stores, distributes and markets (i) ice cream, (ii) soft serve ice 
cream mixes and (iii) frozen desserts. (R. 296, T| 20.a)) Farr avers that "an electric 
condenser fan motor accidentally sheared off its mount and severed an ammonia line 
thereby releasing ammonia that contaminated all of [Farr's] Products stored therein 
thereby rendering the same unmarketable and of no value." (R. 301, ^  26) The insurance 
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policies in effect a( Hit" link ul Hit ,IIIIIIIOIII<I i d t a s t did IIIIHII .itloid a n e i a ^ t lui k m . 
claimed damages (R 302, % 30) Fan* sought a declaration of the respective liability of 
the defendants and an award of damages. (R. 309, f^s 53-54) 
Fai i did not name Centi al Bonds eithen in him ' in mil in! I < iiipliiml I II1"1 I  I 'i I i in 
i1 s A ' »**" J ' - 1 " ' -"• I , MI | ||/ 4VM' P | ) However, once co-defendant/anr- ' l lee Trustco, iiu,. 
("Tru^tc^"» \'\\M its Notice of Intention to Seek Apport ionment of Fault to Steve Kirchen 
and "< .- - • •-• i* Insurance (R 104 06), I ;arr named Central Bonds in h m ,. Il II11miII 
An: h >'• III1. '" 11 I I llhr "<'omplaiiif *) I him Inl n Il lili .i ilnninient 
captioned "Second Amended Complaint.) 
In stating its claim,, against Central Bonds, i arr averred dial ^u-victendaiiLappellee, 
An.( In : « * - I I I < i n I (' "R "« ; * i ' ) "< i H "• - -1 B < >n< Ill ,' 
that Central Bonds became jointly and severallv liable , a L the *^er defendants for 
Reed ' s averred actions and promises regarding the procurement of insurance foi I'arr's 
reiilll piopcity (Is1 KM), "f M), .mid llial (Vnlral Bonds I inic'lior! ulllhni Il mi ill in "s own] I > III', HIT 
(R. 302-03, [^ 30). As remedies, f a i r sought damages, bad-faith damages, costs and 
attorney fees. (R 309-10) 
IL COURSE OF in I"1: in I! 11 in: • I"1: i«: i > i h i : :,:" » ,- i i ill: ill I I S P O S I ' i " 1 < » M I /"» ' in' 
DISTRICT COIJRT 
After completion of fact discoverv Central Bonds filed its Motion and supporting 
mem.orand y^ -^.>i.Hif'. — •.,. led an opposing memorandum,. (I' '11 li I••• 
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89). After oral argument, the district court granted Central Bonds' Motion (R. 3504-05). 
The district court explained its dismissal of Fair's claims against Central Bonds: 
Farr had no contractual relationship with Kirchen or Central Bonds. 
Consequently, all of Fair's causes of action against defendant stem from an 
alleged agency relationship between Reed and Kirchen and Reed and 
Central Bonds, under which Reed, as defendants' agent, acted on their 
behalf and subject to Kirchen and Central Bonds' control. Contrary to 
plaintiffs theory, the record contains no evidence of an agency relationship 
between Reed and Kirchen or Reed and Central Bonds. To be an agent a 
person "must be authorized by another to 'act on his behalf and subject to 
his control'" Gildea v. Guardian Title Co. of Utah. 970 P.2d 1265, 1269 
(Utah l99S)(citing, Restatement (Second) of Agency § 1 (1958)). Here, to 
the contrary, Reed expressly denies that he was an agent of either Kirchen 
or Central Bonds. Second Andrew Reed Deposition, at 399-400. Absent 
evidence of an agency relationship, Fair's claims against Kirchen and 
Central Bonds for breach of contract, bad faith, negligence and estoppel all 
fail. (R. 3505) (emphasis added) 
III. STATEMENTS OF FACTS RELEVANT TO ISSUES PRESENTED 
The following facts were undisputed before the district court. Even though Farr 
purported to "contest" six of these facts discussed in the following footnotes, Fair failed 
to identify any evidence contrary to the competent evidence supporting each of those six 
facts: 
1. Kirchen is an insurance agent licensed by the State of Utah to sell property, 
casualty and life insurance. (R. 2983) 
2. Kirchen is employed as an agent by co-defendant insurance agency, Central 
Bonds and Insurance Agency, Inc. (R. 2983) 
829078 4 
^ ro-dele iuUi l , i U I I K I I Itunkl ! L i •»•-•*»•'• i r m p i i r h i h nl 
involvements in the events at issue in this litigatio
 1V. ^ o ^ j 
\ t all times relevant to the Motion, Dexter Duane Farr ("Mr. Fair"), the 
authorized represniUlm Cm purposes of obtaining insurance coverage for Farr. (R. 
2983) 
5. In that capaciU i u»i customarily conducted an annual review of I '"an: " s 
existing insumikv |i ,' Iliinii " in nil.ml i Iian^rs Can needed to make foi the 
upcoming year. (R. 2983-84* 
6. Mr, Fair had obtained competitive bids for I "an 's insurance need 
approximately 30 3 ^ eai s (R 2984) 
ANDREW REED'S EFFORTS TO SUBMIT A BID FOR FARR'S PROPERTY, 
EQUIPMENT AND LIABILITY INSURANCE 
7. In i^eDruarv nr 
v . .< *ri '• * 1 • Universal Insurance Comp: ^A Kansas ^%'Iiinity"), 
Ain'r^^ Lawn-uu- <*v^  r K e e t P • ked for permission ' Mihn/' ' "* r a Fair's 
commeKid:
 P * , . n . jquipmei, . . ; liability insurance; In , .MIS 
wHrnmr to subnnnfl ,1 hid (R. 2984) 
In its opposing memorandum below, Farr merel) am loin iced that it "contested" this fact 
(R. 3182). However, Farr failed to identify any contrary evidence, thus failing to satisfy 
the requirements of Orvis, Jensen and Anderson Development. 
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8. Mr. Fair was already acquainted with Reed because for the 2002-2003 
policy year Reed was providing Fair with workers' compensation insurance through 
Farmers Insurance Group ("Farmers"). (R. 2984) 
9. At all times material to the Motion, Reed was a "captive" insurance agent 
for Farmers, which means that Reed could represent only Farmers and that he had 
complete allegiance to Farmers. (R. 2984-85) 
10. At no time material to this Motion was Reed the agent of either Kirchen or 
Central Bonds.2 (R. 2985) 
11. On or about March 20, 2003 Reed began gathering information necessary 
for Reed and Farmers to submit a bid for Fair's property, equipment and liability 
insurance. (R. 2985) 
12. To assist Reed in putting together his bid, Mr. Fair provided Reed with the 
declarations of the various coverages of the Trinity policy, but not premium information. 
(R. 2985) 
Fair also announced below that it "contested" this statement (R. 3183). The district 
court found in its Ruling (R. 3505), however, that the undisputed evidence established 
that Reed did not act as Central Bonds' agent while dealing with Fair. Fair never 
identified below, and does not identify on appeal, any evidence establishing that Reed 
was Central Bonds' agent, or that he had actual authority to represent Central Bonds. 
Central Bonds shows in Point II.B, below, that because Fair never communicated with 
Central Bonds it was legally impossible for Reed to have had apparent authority to 
represent Central Bonds in Reed's dealings with Farr. 
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13. In his discussions with Reed at this time, Mr. Fair requested that one item 
of coverage be increased from $600,000 to $700,000, along with maybe a few other items 
as well. (R. 2985) 
14. Mr. Fair admitted that Reed was not in a position to suggest such coverage 
changes because "he wouldn't know" what changes were necessary or appropriate. (R. 
2985) 
15. At some point Reed suggested that Farr raise its existing $25,000 "spoilage 
temperature change" insurance to either $50,000 or $75,000, but Mr. Fair declined to 
raise the coverage limit. (R. 2985) 
16. Reed suggested other changes as well to Fair's coverage. (R. 2986) 
17. At this time Mr. Fair understood that he could select higher coverages if 
Farr paid an additional premium, and that the decision was totally up to him. (R. 2986) 
18. Mr. Fair did not discuss with Reed what the difference in premium would 
be with such increased coverage. (R. 2986) 
FARR'S EFFORTS TO OBTAIN REPLACEMENT PROPERTY, EQUIPMENT AND 
LIABILITY INSURANCE AFTER ITS CARRIER NOTIFIED FARR THAT IT 
WOULD NOT RENEW FARR'S COVERAGE 
19. In a notice dated March 31, 2003, Trinity advised Fair that Trinity would 
not renew Fair's property and liability insurance coverage, which would expire on May 
14,2003. (R.2986) 
829078 7 
20. After receiving Trinity's notice of non-renewal, Mr. Fair spoke with four 
additional insurance agents about procuring replacement property and liability insurance. 
(R. 2986) 
21. As with Reed, Mr. Farr provided these other potential bidders with only the 
declarations of the various coverages of the Trinity policy. He did not give them 
premium information. (R. 2986) 
22. Mr. Farr gave all potential bidders only the declarations from the existing 
Trinity policy so he could get an "apples to applies" comparison from each bidder. (R. 
2986) 
23. Mr. Farr did this because he wanted to look at the same coverages as 
closely as possible so that he could do a cost comparison. (R. 2987) 
24. Mr. Fair told prospective bidders that the prior year's declaration of 
coverages was "the outline I wanted them to go down through. And if they needed to 
make some adjustments on it, we need to make some adjustments." (R. 2987) 
25. In addition to telling Reed that $25,000 was ample for chemical spills, Mr. 
Farr told the same thing to the other potential bidders in 2003. (R. 2987) 
REED ASKS FOR CENTRAL BONDS' ASSISTANCE IN LOCATING PROPERTY 
AND GENERAL LIABILITY INSURANCE FOR FARR 
26. Sometime in March 2003 Reed called Kirchen to see if Central Bonds 
might have a market for the Farr account in the event Farmers was not interested in 
writing it. (R. 2987) 
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27. This was a very casual conversation, and it ended with Reed telling Kirchen 
that Reed would call Kirchen if Reed needed Central Bonds' and Kirchen's help. (R. 
2987) 
28. Reed contacted his friend Kirchen because Reed did not want an unfriendly 
agent to divert Farr's workers' compensation and automobile coverages from Reed. (R. 
2988) 
29. Within a week of his meeting with Mr. Fair, Reed knew that Farmers 
would not issue a bid for Farr's property and general liability coverage because of the 
proximity of two of Farr's Salt Lake City buildings to each other. (R. 2988) 
30. Reed and Farmers did, however, have the workers compensation and 
automobile liability coverages "wrapped up" and wanted to keep that portion of Farr's 
business. (R. 2988) 
31. In Reed's capacity as a "captive" agent, he was free to try to place coverage 
with other carriers if Farmers declined coverage. (R. 2988) 
32. In early to mid-April Reed told Kirchen that Farmers had declined to write 
property and general liability coverage for Fair, and that Reed "was looking for a home 
for it". (R.2988) 
33. Thereafter, Reed gave Farr's bid specifications (the declarations from the 
Trinity policy) to Kirchen. (R.2988) 
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34. Kirchen said that he would "'go to market" to see if he could place property 
and general liability insurance coverage for Fair. (R. 2988) 
35. Although Reed referred bond work to Central Bonds, he did not receive a 
kickback or a commission for those referrals. (R. 2988) 
36. Kirchen and Reed agreed that any bid that Kirchen solicited would not "dip 
as low" as Fair's bid specifications called for. (R. 2989) 
37. Kirchen then contacted CNA, Allied and Auto Owners Insurance ("Auto 
Owners") insurance companies. (R. 2989) 
38. CNA declined to make a quotation because of a "time issue", i.e., it needed 
more time than was available to properly estimate and price the risks involved. (R. 2989) 
39. Allied declined to make a quotation because of concerns about ammonia 
losses, spoilage and property values, among other things. (R. 2989) 
40. Kirchen also approached Auto Owners about quoting property and general 
liability coverage for Fair. (R. 2989) 
41. Central Bonds and Kirchen had access to an in-house Auto Owners rating 
program that allowed them to use "information from the insured to go in and classify 
business, rate it up, price it out, and then work with the underwriters on final pricing, 
coverages, etc." (R. 2989) 
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42. Neither Kirchen nor Central Bonds had the authority to bind the property 
and general liability coverage that Farr required. (R. 2989) 
43. Auto Owners' regional underwriter was "comfortable" with the pricing 
Kirchen generated from the in-house rating system, but emphasized that Auto Owners' 
home office would have to make the final underwriting decision because of the size of 
the prospective Farr account and the high property values involved with Farr's Salt Lake 
City facilities.4 (R. 2989-90) 
44. Probably on May 13, 2003, Kirchen provided to the Auto Owners 
underwriting department all the information he had assembled to that point regarding 
Farr. (R. 2990) 
3
 Farr similarly contested this fact below (R. 3183-84). Again, however, Farr identified 
no evidence establishing that Central Bonds in fact had authority to bind coverage. Farr 
cited only to Reed's testimony, but Reed testified that he had no idea whether Central 
Bonds could bind Auto Owners coverage (R. 3480-81). As a result, Farr again has failed 
to satisfy the requirements of Orvis, Jensen and Anderson Development. 
4
 This is the fourth fact that Farr contested below (R. 3183-84), but again Farr did not 
identify any evidence to dispute it. Farr cited only to Reed's testimony, but Reed testified 
that he had no idea whether Central Bonds could bind Auto Owners coverage (R. 3480-
81). Kirchen unequivocally testified that he could not bind, and that Auto Owners would 
not write (or bind) Farr's Salt Lake location where the Loss occurred, and that Auto 
Owners could not write the spoilage and equipment breakdown ("Spoilage") coverage 
necessary to cover Farr's Loss (R. 3477). Reed admitted that he had no factual basis for 
disputing Kirchen's sworn testimony (R. 3483-84). Once again, there is no evidence that 
Central Bonds was able to or did bind coverage, or that Auto Owners could have bound 
or issued coverage, for Farr's Salt Lake location or for the Loss that Farr incurred. Once 
again, Farr has failed to satisfy the requirements of Orvis, Jensen and Anderson 
Development. 
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45. Kirchen knew, however, that because of its reinsurance agreements with 
other insurance companies who insured such risks, Auto Owners could not quote spoilage 
or equipment breakdown ("Spoilage") coverage for Fair's Salt Lake City facilities. (R. 
2990) 
46. As a result, Auto Owners could not write Spoilage coverage that would 
have covered the loss that Fair incurred (the "Loss"). (R. 3448, 3477) 
47. In order to get Spoilage coverage for Fair's Salt Lake City facilities, 
Kirchen requested a separate quotation for that coverage from Travelers Boiler Express 
("Travelers"). (R. 2990) 
48. Kirchen requested Travelers to quote a higher Spoilage limit than was 
shown in Fair's bid specifications, and the Travelers quote shows Spoilage coverage limit 
of $100,000. (R.2990) 
THE MAY 2003 BIDDERS FOR FARR'S PROPERTY AND LIABILITY 
INSURANCE 
49. Lund-Leavitt Insurance Agency submitted a bid dated May 12, 2003 for 
Fair's property, equipment and liability insurance. (R. 2990) 
50. Diversified Insurance Brokers submitted a bid dated May 13, 2003 for 
Fair's property, equipment and liability insurance. (R. 2991) 
51. On the afternoon of May 14, 2003, Blackburn Jones Company ("Blackburn 
Jones"), which had represented Farr since some time in the '70s or early '80s with 
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occasional gaps, and had placed Farr's coverage with Trinity beginning in 2000, gave Mr. 
Farr an oral bid for coverage to be written by Safeco. (R. 2991) 
52. The Blackburn Jones/Safeco bid was about $8,000 higher than the 
Reed/Farmers bid. (R. 2991) 
53. The proposal that Reed gave Mr. Farr described various coverages, but the 
only copy of that proposal admitted into evidence does not show a premium.5 (R. 2991) 
54. There is no evidence in the Record of the premium that Reed quoted to Mr. 
Farr or of the components of that premium. (R. 2991) 
55. Because the proposed coverages in the Lund-Leavitt, Diversified Insurance 
Brokers, Blackburn Jones/Safeco and Reed/Farmers proposals afforded about the same 
coverage, Mr. Farr "chose Farmers Insurance Company" because it had the best price of 
the three, and sometime the morning of May 14, 2003, Mr. Fair told Reed that Fair would 
accept the Farmers bid. (R. 2991-92) 
56. Mr. Farr probably looked at the prices more than anything else. (R. 2992) 
57. In fact, for this particular year and in the 8-10 preceding years, Mr. Fan-
accepted the lowest bid for Farr's insurance. (R. 2992) 
58. After Mr. Farr awarded him Farr's insurance business, Reed asked Mr. Farr 
who submitted the next closest quote for Farr's insurance; Mr. Farr told Reed that it was 
Safeco. (R.2992) 
5
 Central Bonds discusses the significance of the various 2003 insurance quotations in 
Point VII, infra. 
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59. As of May 14, 2003, Mr. Farr still understood from Reed that Farmers 
would provide all of Fair's insurance, including property and liability coverage. (R. 
2992) 
EVENTS FOLLOWING MAY 14, 2003 
60. On May 22nd or 23rd, Auto Owners' regional office advised Kirchen that 
Auto Owners' home office had declined property and general liability coverage. (R. 
2992) 
61. Insurance from both Auto Owners and Travelers were necessary parts of a 
whole package. When Auto Owners declined to issue a quotation for Fair's property and 
general liability coverage, the Travelers bid "went away".6 (R. 2992) 
62. Kirchen immediately informed Reed that Auto Owners would not issue a 
quotation for Fair's property and general liability insurance. (R. 2992) 
63. After Reed learned that Auto Owners would not issue a quotation for Farr, 
he told Kirchen that Safeco had an outstanding bid through another agent, and that Reed 
thought that he might be able to place Fair's property and general liability coverage 
through an insurance agency that represented Safeco. (R. 2993) 
6
 Finally, Farr contested below (R. 3184-85) Undisputed Facts 61 and 62 (numbered 
below as Undisputed Facts 63 and 64 (R. 2992-93)). In doing so, Farr merely reiterated 
arguments it made elsewhere. Farr identified no evidence supporting its challenge, and 
did not dispute below Undisputed Facts 47 and 48 in Central Bonds' initial memorandum 
(R. 2990) (Undisputed Facts 45 and 47 above), both of which provide the unchallenged 
foundation for the two challenged paragraphs. Once again, Farr has failed to satisfy the 
requirements of Orvis, Jensen and Anderson Development. 
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64. Kirchen told Reed that he knew someone at another independent insurance 
agency, co-defendant, Trustco, Inc. ("Trustco"), which was a Safeco agent, and Reed 
asked Kirchen to call Trustco to see if it would be interested in working with Reed to 
quote the outstanding Safeco bid. (R. 2993) 
65. Kirchen then telephoned Troy Granger ("Granger") of Trustco to explain 
the situation to him. (R. 2993) 
66. Granger said he was interested, and Kirchen agreed to ask Reed to call 
Granger. (R. 2993) 
67. Kirchen then told Reed that he could call Granger. (R. 2993) 
68. Kirchen and Central Bonds had no further involvement with the Fan-
account. (R.2993) 
69. On May 23, 2003 Reed told Mr. Fair that Fair had no property and liability 
insurance in place. (R. 2993) 
70. Until then, Mr. Fair had understood that Fair had been insured with no 
lapse in coverage. (R. 2993) 
71. Accordingly on May 23, 2003, Mr. Fair signed a letter to Safeco Insurance 
that Reed had prepared asking Safeco to bind coverage effective May 23, 2003. (R. 
2994) 
72. Mr. Fair understood that Reed needed the letter so that Reed "could 
represent the insurance which Farmers wasn't going to cover." (R. 2994) 
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73. Also on May 23, 2003, Mr. Fair gave Reed a $10,640.00 check made 
payable to "Safeco". (R. 2994) 
74. Safeco issued a policy covering Farr's property and general liability that 
had an effective date of May 23,2003. (R. 2994) 
75. Fair claims that late in the night of May 29, 2003, a motor mount broke 
loose from its housing in Farr's Salt Lake City frozen ice cream storage facility, causing a 
blower fan to come into contact with, and to sever, an ammonia line coil which led to 
ammonia contamination of Farr's ice cream inventory and requiring its destruction. (R. 
2994) 
76. Safeco admitted liability up to the policy limit for the Loss and issued a 
check to Fair for the policy limit. (R. 2994) 
ADDITIONAL UNDISPUTED FACTS PERTAINING TO FARR 
77. Fair never received a copy of any Auto Owners insurance binder. (R. 
2994) 
78. Before the Loss, the highest limit Fair ever had for ammonia contamination 
was $50,000. (R.2994) 
79. At his deposition Mr. Fair did not know who Kirchen is. (R. 2995) 
80. At his deposition Mr. Fair could not recall ever talking to Kirchen. (R. 
2995) 
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ADDITIONAL UNDISPUTED FACTS PERTAINING TO REED 
81. Reed does not know what authority Kirchen and Central Bonds had to bind 
Auto Owners. (R. 3448, 3480-81) 
82. Reed does not know what exclusions and endorsements apply to Auto 
Owners policies, and cannot recall what, if anything, Kirchen told Reed about Auto 
Owners exclusions and endorsements. (R. 3449, 3482) 
83. Reed has no factual basis to dispute Kirchen's statement that Auto Owners 
could not have written the coverage that would have applied to Farr's Loss. (R. 3449, 
3483) 
84. Reed never received a writing from Central Bonds saying that coverage was 
bound. (R. 3450, 3484) 
85. Kirchen never told Reed that coverage was bound. (R. 3450, 3484) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
As a favor to a friend of Kirchen's, Kirchen and Central Bonds spent three weeks 
in May 2003 trying to find insurance coverage for a company (Fair) that Kirchen never 
spoke with. 
Notwithstanding its utter lack of contact with Central Bonds, Farr now claims that 
that Central Bonds (i) assumed a duty to procure coverage for Fair's risks, (ii) orally 
committed Auto Owners to provide that coverage; (iii) breached its contract with Farr by 
failing to obtain that coverage; and (iv) committed bad faith in denying that Auto Owners 
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had bound coverage for Fair's Loss. Farr also brought (but did not discuss in its initial 
brief) an estoppel claim against Central Bonds. 
As the party with the burden of proof at trial, Farr is obliged to set forth facts 
sufficient to establish the existence of each element essential to its various claims. Fan-
repeatedly tries to establish its assertions with argument, not with facts, and the record 
contains no evidentiary support for critical elements of Fair's claims. Fair's failure to 
establish even one element essential to each of its claims necessarily renders all other 
facts immaterial, and that claim fails. 
For example, Fair claims that some, if not all, of its claims against Central Bonds 
are derivative of Reed's acts. Both Reed and Central Bonds deny that there was any 
agency, and the Record is devoid of any evidence to the contrary. 
Furthermore, controlling precedent makes clear that (i) Central Bonds was under 
no duty to Farr; (ii) Central Bonds' efforts did not result in a binder or other contract of 
insurance; and (iii) Farr's claims against Central Bonds are too speculative. Because 
there was no contract between Central Bonds and Fair, there is no basis for Fair's bad 
faith claim against Central Bonds. Fair's estoppel claim fails because Farr had no contact 
with Kirchen and Central Bonds, and could not have relied on any admission, statement 
or act of Central Bonds. 
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ARGUMENT 
Fair's opening brief characterizes its claims against Central Bonds in two different 
ways. At page 18 Fan* recites that in its Complaint Farr asserted claims against all 
appellees foi (I) bi e.ti/li I i onlui I l iiii) negligence; (iii) bad faith; an ;:1 (i i ) promissory 
estoppel. In Fair's discussion oi its claims against Central Bonds at pages 36-40 
characterizes its claims against Central Bonds differently: '•* Central Bonds assumed a 
c insurance :, . :u ;„a . „; , ..in; insurance coverage 
from Auto Owners; (iii) despite the fact that Central Bounds orally bound coverage, it 
failed to provide coverage to Fan* in accordance with the oral contract of insurance; and 
(Iv) Central Bonds breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing by claiming that 
it did not proci ire ii ISI irance tl lat co ' " '* Jr 
concluded that Fair's Complaint did not MIM the issue of m oral binder, (f J^LLI; 
However, even though Farr s Complaint did not raise the "oral binder" clain 1, as a 
precaution, iiowr VT, (Vntral Bonds will ftddtvss tli.il rLiini i -7 . 
In this brief, Central Bonds will respond to Fair's reformulated arguments 
contained at pages 36 40 of I ; an*' s initial brief , Central Bonds will address Fair's claims 
in this ordei 1 lull I111I m i l i i i i e g l i g e t i u Iiiiiii! i i i i l i ' . n l 1I1111 , I I M I I I I J h i i ! ' " 1 ! 1 l . i i i in l h ; i l i V i i l r . i l 
Bonds "bound" coverage); and (iii) bad faith. After that discussion, Central Bonds will 
discuss I-arr's estoppel claim, which it fails to address in the portion of its initial brief 
direr 
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claims against Central Bonds are all so speculative as to preclude its recovery from 
Central Bonds irrespective of the Court's analysis of the other issues. 
However, Central Bonds first discusses two preliminary matters. First, Central 
Bonds shows in Point I, infra, that there is a separate basis for affirmance of the dismissal 
of Central Bonds and Insurance Company from this action. Second, Fair seeks to hold 
Central Bonds liable for Reed's acts despite Reed's sworn testimony that he was not 
Central Bonds' agent. Central Bonds shows in Point II, infra, that Reed had neither 
actual nor apparent authority to act on behalf of Central Bonds in his dealings with Fair. 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED FARR'S 
CLAIMS AGAINST CENTRAL BONDS AND INSURANCE 
COMPANY INCORPORATED 
The two corporate Central Bonds entities have similar names: (i) Central Bonds & 
Insurance Agency, Inc. and (ii) Central Bonds and Insurance Company Incorporated. 
Kirchen testified under oath that the latter, Central Bonds and Insurance Company, Inc., 
had no involvement in the events surrounding this action (R. 2983). Fair contested this 
before the district court, but identified no contrary evidence. The district court found: 
As an initial matter, in opposition to defendants' motion, Fair fails to 
effectively dispute and support with contrary evidence defendant Central 
Bonds and Insurance Company, Incorporated's claim that it had no 
involvement in the events at issue in this litigation. Accordingly, defendant 
Central Bonds and Insurance Company, Inc.'s Motion for Summary 
Judgment is granted. (R. 3504) 
Fair does not challenge or even discuss this ruling by the District Court. There is 
no evidence in the Record that Central Bonds and Insurance Company was involved in 
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tlii' nents MIIIUIINIIIIM1 I<MI '. I'I.IIIIII'H I i iln< .IIMIIIOIMI M .IS<UJ„ along wnli ,ill other 
reasons addressed in this brief, this Court should affirm the district court's dismissal of 
all i'^ Fair's claims against co-defendant Central Bonds and Insurance Company 
I- I 
II. REED WAS NOT CENTRAL BONDS' AGENT 
To some extent, Fair seeks to hold Central Bonds liable for its own acts or for 
Ra:d\ .1 i1, I I \ linnevet, Kin must provide evidence that Central Bonds gave 
Reed either actual or apparent authority. See, < ^ 
Corp., 762 P.2d 1090, 1094 (Utah 1988). The district court expressly observed that the 
Recoi d c Dntains no e \ Idence of an agency relationship between Reed and Kirchee or 
Reed and Central Bonds. (R. 3505) 
Fair has failed to identify any evidence showing that Reed had actual authority to 
represent Central Bonds. Because ; in- never spoke with Central Bonds, it was legally 
impossible for Reed to have had apparent authc 1 it) I: 11 epresent Cent 1 al Boi ids 
1
 Reed Did Not Have Actual Authority to Represent Central Bonds 
Reed expressly denied that he was Kirchen's or Central Bonds' agent. There is no 
contrary evidence in the Record that Reei 
Kirchen or Central Bonds in his dealings with Fair. 
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B. Reed Did Not Have Apparent Authority to Represent Central Bonds 
For there to be apparent authority, the principal must cause third parties to believe 
that the agent represents the principal. See id. at 1095. Because Fair had no 
communication with Central Bonds (who would have to create Reed's apparent 
authority), it was impossible as a matter of law for Reed to have apparent authority to act 
on behalf of Central Bonds or Kirchen. Because Reed was not Central Bonds' agent, 
Central Bonds cannot be liable for Reed's actions. 
Furthermore, the record contains no evidence that Central Bonds is liable to Fan-
as a result of anything that Central Bonds itself did or failed to do. 
III. CENTRAL BONDS DID NOT OWE A DUTY TO FARR TO 
PROCURE INSURANCE 
Duty is an essential element of negligence. See Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 
P.2d 231, 235 (Utah 1993). It is axiomatic that a plaintiff cannot recover in tort unless a 
defendant owes plaintiff a duty. See Yazd v. Woodside Homes Corp., 2006 UT 47 ^ 11, 
143 P.3d283. Accordingly, the analysis of every tort claim necessarily begins with an 
inquiry into the existence and scope of the duty that a defendant owes the plaintiff. See 
id. 
The issue of whether Central Bonds owed any duty to Fan* "is a purely legal 
question, and . . . is the first question to be answered." Id., ^ 14. Duty is not assumed, 
presumed or reserved for trial. When a plaintiff cannot prove that a duty exists, it is 
proper to dismiss its claims early in the case. See, e.g, Webb v. Univ. of Utah, 2005 UT 
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8(»1| > ! ""» V M( "inii iiiinlmii In Iisiiiiss) )i>umrv Suit I uke t ity Ac hoot Dist /IN)/ I 11 
64 H 7, 52 P.3d 1230 (summary judgment); 5eae/i v. University of ( -'I'.I/L, V<, P "M A I \ 
416 (Utah 1986) (summary judgment). 
1 . .. . oncluding that Central Bonds was under no duty 
to procure insurance for Fan*. 
In Lewis v. Pike, 663 P.2d 91 (I Jtah 1983) the Lewises gave a trust deed to 
defendants to : :)llateralize a loan. ... • , v-. i> . .^ .as itai -h did not ^\i~* *~ 
encumber the marital residence wile t 
time of the loan the Lewises could not agree whether * i» • Lewis' life should be insured 
* Lewises told the lender" that tl it] ' would decide about the 
insurance for Mrs, I ev is and let the lendei 1 ::i IC > A ' tl leii decision. 
Later ewis tried to order insurance from Pike. They exchanged calls and 
visits, i>u; me t""* never were able to contact each other !\ ir, I ,ewis died over two 
months after taking nui iilii I .in \\\\\ IIIIIII inn, IIIMIMIU'I mui h.t\ mg U r n pkia/il HI Ins 
life. Id. 
Even though no insurance had been placed, Mrs. Lewis contended that the lender 
was negligent IIIIIII IIIIIII nil iiv-iinni1 llic IIISIIIKIIIH I iillul ill km n illln; I vv iscs w.tiilnl In m i l i u m 
this argument, and affirming the district court's dismissal of Mrs. Lewis' complaint, the 
Court wrote: 
Plaintiff further contends that Pike 's failure to follow up on Mr. Lewis' 
requests and inquiries constitutes negligence on his part and is actionable 
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by her because she was jointly and severally liable with him on the loan. 
This argument presupposes that there was some legal duty on Pike to 
contact Mr. Lewis and assist him in making a decision as to the Lewis's 
insurance requirements. Plaintiff has not cited us to any authority that in 
such an instance there is any legal duty on the part of an insurance agent to 
promptly follow up on inquiries. 
Id. at 92 (emphasis added). 
More recently, in Harris v. Albrecht, 2004 UT 13, 86 P.3d 728, the Utah Supreme 
Court relied on Lewis and on decisions from other jurisdictions to explain its affirmance 
of the district court's dismissal of property owner Harris' claims against insurance agent 
Albrecht: 
The instant case is similar to Lewis v. Pike, where the court granted 
summary judgment against a plaintiff who failed to place a "specific order 
for insurance." Likewise, in Stockberger v. Meridian Mutual Insurance 
Co., the court stated that no liability arose unless the plaintiff gave 
sufficient directions to enable the agent to create a final contract. Harris 
failed to give Albrecht sufficient instructions to impose a duly to procure 
insurance, and the missing terms could not be implied from the parties' 
prior dealings. See Lewis; Boston Camping Distrib. Co. v. Lumbermens 
Mut. Cas. Co. (holding a request for coverage from "A to Z, second to 
none" expressed only an intent to obtain insurance); Wallis v. Liberty Mut. 
Ins. Co. (noting that an agent "instructed" by the insured to procure 
insurance did not assume a duty). Here, Harris merely requested insurance 
and expressed a desire to procure insurance. 
The nature of the losses here underscores the reason summary judgment 
was appropriate. The most basic business policy includes $5,000 of 
protection for valuable papers. Albrecht only had binding authority up to 
$25,000 for valuable papers, and Harris could not have received such 
coverage without taking loss-reduction measures. 
Harris, 2004 UT 13, ^ 29 & n.2 (emphasis added) (reporter citations omitted). 
In the process of concluding that insurance agent Albrecht had no duty to architect 
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Harris, Iiii I i ml mi h iilitictl I  IIIIII larlois lliat are rek-* n; in determining il an insurance 
agent has assumed a duty to procure insurance: 
(1) whether [the agent] gave the proposed insured an application, (2) 
whether [the agent] made a bare acknowledgment of a contract covering a 
specific kind of casualty even though all the terms had not been settled, (3) 
whether [the agent] made promises to procure insurance that lulled [the 
proposed insured] into believing a policy had been procured, and (4) 
whether there were prior dealings where [the agent] took care of [the 
proposed insured]'s needs without consultation 
Id "Is 22 and 2 ) - V* in Harris, id <il 111 "' K only the last three factors are relevant to this 
case. Analysis of'tlirsc thrcv fai Im in.tkcN 
duty to procure insurance for Farr. 
First, a "bare acknowledgment" occurs when an agent confirms coverage pending 
I l i r i s i i i i i i i H ' n l i IMI IIIIIII ill 1 "l VillI.IIII I "Iniimi*IK i HI I u i i i t 'd 
nothing to Farr because they never communicated with Farr. Indeed, until May 23, 2003, 
Farr believed that Farmers had insured Fair 's property and general liability risks. 
Second, Ion rssrmull I >•" ii/asmis, i\ in Iiiini ami iVinul boutls promised 
Fair nothing and did not * _ ; j refraining from doing anything to protect itself. 
• ..U03 Mr. Fail "chose Farmers", accepted the "Farmers" bid, and understood 
i II mi II ill I I I I I I i d i i l l II ml II IIIIIII i n • i i i . m i i II i i t 1 II I I I I I II i i i ] » ( i i 11 [ i n " II l \ mi i I I In in h i 111 \ 
coverage On May 23, 2003, Mr. Fair learned that Safeco would cover the insurance that 
"Farmers wasn't going to cover." At no time during the Spring of 2003 did Mr. Farr 
hiiiiiin 11 I 111 IkiiH'ilm mi in ( ni ii ai llMiiiiHls i yslnil HI MI ill llllic) Iliad unsuccessfully tried to place 
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Farr's insurance with four different carriers. 
Third, it is undisputed that there were no prior dealings between Fair on the one 
hand and Kirchen and Central Bonds on the other. 
The Harris Court affirmed the district court's summary judgment because 
"Albrechtfs comments failed to rise to the level of a promise to procure insurance and 
were insufficient to lull Harris into believing a policy had been procured because they 
lacked the requisite specificity. An agent must affirmatively assure the insured that a 
policy will be procured or has been procured." Id. *|[ 24. Kirchen and Central Bonds did 
not make any such assurances. 
Harris identifies yet another reason why Kirchen and Central Bonds were under 
no duty in this case: the "customization required for a business policy" such as the one 
Fair needed. See id., \ 26. Here Mr. Fair acknowledged that (i) he had requested one 
change to Farr's prior coverage; (ii) an agent "wouldn't know" what changes were 
necessary or appropriate without information from Mr. Fair; (iii) even though Reed 
suggested raising the Spoilage loss limit, Mr. Fair declined to do so; (iv) Reed had 
suggested other changes to Farr's insurance coverage; (v) he understood that Fair could 
obtain higher coverage if it paid for it; (vi) he would address suggested "adjustments" to 
coverage when they arose; (vii) he selected the insurance carrier in May 2003 based on 
price and awarded Farr's business to the lowest bidder and had accepted the lowest bid 
for the prior 8-10 years; (viii) Fair had never had more than $50,000 in coverage for 
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a I 1111111 i i I «in i unlit i in i in 1111I1111 in i i i I III I I ' I ' I in .HI lii" received 11i > m insurance carriers were merely 
"bids". 
As in Harris, the kaleidoscopic nature of commercial insurance made it 
"impossible1" lor kndien and Central Bonds to have provided Fair with a "standard 
business policy". See id. 'There simply was no v a; >./ loi 
have known what Fair would ultimately elecl to bu>. Furthermore, the coverage Fan* 
needed was beyond Kirchen's and Central Bonds authority to bind. The same was true 
for Albrecht. See id. 
In Harris, Albrecht lulled Harris "into believing that [Albrecht] would come out 
and look, at [I Ian is' j business." Id t ?,7. Even this amount of lulling was insufficient, 
howevn ' -i'Mtc itih "« hi ' " ' Ibiu'i l le p'l'uiu1 i. anam. Baau » il unci spoke 
with Mr. Fair, Central Bonds could not have lulled Mr. Fair even to that limited extent. 
Therefore, just as Albrecht was under no duly lo obtain insurance for Harris, 
CVntial Bonds1 H I UIIIHIHI mm illiiil1,, lo n tin lain iiL-aiiain c <, o\ ci.i^i lot law \\ ithout such a 
duty Central Bonds could not have been negligent. Accordingly, the distrk 
properly dismissed Fair's negligence/duty claims against Central Bonds. 
P ' CENTRAL BONDS' EFFORTS DID NOT RESULT IN A BINDER 
OR OTHER CONTRACT OF INSURANCE 
Whether a contract has been formed is a question of law. See, e.g., Harris, ]\ 9. In 
ill in n tise, plaimnr' Harris, an architect, told defendant Albrecht, an insurance agent, "to 
place business and fire1 covnvifM1 II |ll I,iiiiiiis"| nimpiiu'iil .iiiiull Hi / I'OIIIUIIN a! his c I hue." 
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Id., Tf 5. Harris responded that "he would take care of it," and that "he would come out 
and look at [the] equipment. Id. 
The Harris Court explained why no contract to procure insurance arose from this 
exchange: 
They did not discuss any of the elements essential to an insurance contract 
except that Harris "wanted business and fire coverage on [the] equipment 
and the contents" of his architectural business. There was no mention, 
except fire, of the types of risks Harris wanted covered, the amount of 
indemnity, the duration of coverage, or the premium. Therefore, there was 
no meeting of the minds on which to base a contract of insurance. Id., f 10. 
A. There Was No Meeting of the Minds Regarding the Coverage Fair Would 
Buy 
Mr. Fair knew that bidders for Fair's insurance coverage might propose 
"adjustments" to Fair's coverage, which he would then need to evaluate. In fact, Kirchen 
and Reed agreed that any bids Kirchen solicited would not "dip as low" as Fair's bid 
specifications called for. Consistent with this agreement, Kirchen asked Travelers to 
quote Spoilage coverage of $100,000 rather than the $10,000 that Farr's bid 
specifications called for. Thus, the amount of indemnity was uncertain until Mr. Fan-
decided if Fair would pay for the increased coverage. As in Harris, the bid specifications 
said nothing about the duration of coverage, or the premium. Mr. Fair repeatedly 
recognized the insurance quotations for what they were: mere bids that he would need to 
evaluate. 
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IfiuTt" M 111 m iilnior iiilliiii I* in hen MI < 'cnlial Bonds promised • • -lam property 
and general liability insurance for Farr. There is no evidence that Farr prom-.-** \ 
whatever quotation Kirchen and Central Bonds might procure. In 2003 Fair intended to 
awai • :i its insi it ance :: inti act t : tl i = 1 : sst 1: idder, as it had foi the preceding 8-10 years. 
Just as in Harris, then, there simply was no meeting H (in1 minds nit win- li h> IMW1" j 
contract of insurance. 
Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-1-102 Does Not Create Any Liability for Central 
Bonds 
Farr did not claim below, and does not claim on appeal, that it received a writfi'n 
binder growing out of Central Bonds efforts. Farr argued below t; ' :i .i. hcie is a 
i|iu'stion | |(' fiM'< » '(' ",|ir|||ri |li|> 's-uliji1! | ( 'innajL',*' w-is ouill\ bound un Mas I I -'0IM 
by Kirchen and Central Bonds (emphasis added)." (R. 3187) 
Fair claims that § 31A 1-102 caused this alleged "oral binder" to still be ii I effect 
nil1 ml i ! mi 11 IN n i l I I - i i II ( I 1 i Ill ill II i I ill i ice independently insurmountable problems 
with its argument under § 31A 1402. 
First, Farr never explains what Central Bonds did to orally bind coverage on May 
il 1, }(H|(i "it ,ii jiiiii1, piiiri inn1 l rniijl iliimuls lias aheaily sho\ui in J'uinl l\ A dial (hare 
was no meeting of the minds on a contract of insurance. Additionalh antral Bonds 
shown elsewhere in this brief that Farr has no competent evidence of any such oral 
I t i nde t 
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Second, § 31 A-1-102 does not recognize "oral binders". Section 31 A-1-102(1) 
expressly requires "binders" to be in writing. Oral agreements to insure are not binders at 
all. They are instead "binding oral contracts of insurance". See § 31A-21-102(2). 
Third, § 31A-21-102(5) only provides that written binders are effective until their 
cancellation. Nothing in § 31A-21-102 provides that an oral contract of insurance 
continues until cancellation. For all these reasons, the district court properly dismissed 
Farr's contract claim against Central Bonds. 
V. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED FARR'S BAD 
FAITH CLAIM AGAINST CENTRAL BONDS 
Utah law recognizes a bad-faith claim in favor of policyholders against their 
insurance carriers. See generally, Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 701 P.2d 795, 798 (Utah 
1985). It is undisputed in this case, however, that neither Kirchen nor Central Bonds is 
an insurance carrier. 
Because first-party insurance principles do not apply to Farr's claims against 
Kirchen and Central Bonds, Farr's bad-faith claim must satisfy standards that have arisen 
in the context of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing (the "Covenant"). 
Utah law has long adhered to the fundamental premise that courts will not resort to 
the Covenant to make a better contract for the parties than they made for themselves. 
See, e.g., Brown v. Moore, 973 P.2d 950, 954 (Utah 1998). Similarly, the Covenant 
cannot establish new, independent rights or duties that the parties did not agree to. See 
id. 
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I investors in a failed th i ift institution claimed the I Jtah 
Department of Financial Institutions f'DIT")' Imul In i-.n linl tl < 'inn ,mi In i l(iiiuj« \hv 
thrift without allowing the investors sufficient time to recoup their investments. I he 
closure resulted trout 1)H > decision not fo continue to count certain "nel worth 
certificates" toward tin ui-,iiiiiin»ii • 111,1(111,1! M | m'nn ni illn rvhMiijLi (1 ni| ih 1 In 
Covenant despite their "sympathy with plaintiffs' plight," id. at 955, the Utah Supreme 
Court held: 
plaintiffs cannot point to any express contractual obligation on the part of 
DFI to continue to count the net worth certificates toward operating capital 
requirements regardless of the ILGCs financial condition, or to any 
representation from which we could conclude that DFI assumed the risk of 
the ILGCs insolvency. 
I hnr is in 1 n idrntv in this 1 -M HI ii I itii suppnil ,1 bad-faith claim against Kirchen and 
Central Bonds because there is no agreement that can provide 
contractual obligation necessary for the Covenant to arise. For these reasons - and for 
uiorandum - there was no Auto Owners insurance 
in effect at the time of Fair's Loss, and Central Bonds' denial that * 
faith". 
1 ' I. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED PARR'S 
ESTOPPEL CLAIM AGAINST CENTRAL BONDS. 
For Fair to prevail on its estoppel claim against Central Bonds, the Record must 
contain some evidence that Fair took some action "on the faith" of some admission, 
statement in ;t" * I" v < "l| n'" >' UMIIII V «", CII, Ifiiw
 ( / 1 "nn'iii11"! »' Okelberry, 2006 
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App. 473, If 28, 153 P.3d 745, rev'd on other grounds, 2008 UT 10, f 7, 2008 WL 
360842, — P.3d—. 
It is undisputed that no one at Fair had ever heard of Kirchen or Central Bonds 
prior to Fair's Loss. Farr never received a copy of any binder growing out of Kirchen's 
and Central Bonds' efforts. Until May 23, 2003, Mr. Farr thought that Farmers was 
insuring Fair. After that and at the time of Farr's Loss, Mr. Farr believed Safeco was 
insuring the risks that Farmers would not insure. 
As a result, it is not legally possible for Farr to have taken any action on the faith 
of any admission, statement or act by Kirchen or Central Bonds. Because Farr took no 
such action, the district court properly dismissed Farr's estoppel claim against Central 
Bonds. 
VII. FARR'S CLAIMS AGAINST CENTRAL BONDS ARE TOO 
SPECULATIVE TO STATE A CLAIM 
Even if Central Bonds had been able to bind coverage for Farr's Loss (which 
Central Bonds could not and did not do), there is no evidence that Fair would have 
purchased that coverage. Without such evidence Fair's claims against Central Bonds are 
speculative. 
In May 2003 Farr "chose Farmers" based on price. Farr had had accepted the 
lowest bid for the prior 8-10 years. There is no evidence that even if Central Bonds had 
been able to obtain coverage, it would have resulted in the lowest bid. 
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The onl> evidence of a quotation from Central Bonds in the record is Deposition 
Ex. 57 (R. 3458-67), lluil ih inlur pmposiil inn 'Hiitni n miiun III.II IMII I Ltiiiioil 
below (R. 3184-85, 3187) established the "Subject Coverage" and was bound. I here is 
no evidence in the Record, however, that the Fair ever laid eyes on premium amount that 
appears in Deposition I;x V/'" rilhci tn I Li1" ' l-l .'MIO'i ui ,„it ,nr ' I-IIHT dine, 
R e e d testified that he had main ta ined in his file a comple t e cop1, of his l\l„i"» MUM 
proposa l to Fair , that he turned over his entire file to Steve R. T.ove, an expert re tained by 
l;in mi I i | i , i i ill r"iiv<H« MIIIIMS (i(ii|nnsii! produced l)\ kin ^ now not complete. 
2991) The Lund-Leavitt and Diversified bids were ibi aiuouiits deUTininahli In 
record, and the Blackburn Jones/Safeco bid was $8,000 higher than the Reed/Farmers 
lliiKil Mini1 is mi ,iifi)M(iiil vva>, IHJWCICI, to recreate what the Reed/Farmers bid was. (R 
2991) Thus, the Reed/Farmers bid, which * as tl le 1c < bi :l I I le i lext 
lowest bid was the oral bid from Blackburn Jones/Safeco, which was $8,000 higher than 
ii'lir lu'al/hitittns bid. 
Thus, Fan* has failed to show that Deposition l;\ S7 nr .iihlhint.', I'ISC lioin ( 'I'liti.il 
Bonds/Auto Owners would have been the low bid. Without such a showing Fair's claims 
against (Vnlul H nnh *ue impermissibly speculative because in 2003 and for the 8-10 
preceding years, Mr. Fair had accepted the lowest bid ^ 
Additionally, in Point III, supra, Central Bonds identified nine separate variables 
tl lat ( \ T' : i ild enter in to I 'arr' s insurance purchasing decision in 2003. In additioi :i to those 
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nine variables, Kirchen and Reed had agreed that any bids Kirchen solicited would not 
"dip as low" as Fair's bid specifications called for, and Kirchen accordingly asked 
Travelers to quote Spoilage coverage of $100,000 rather than the $10,000 that the bid 
specifications called for. There is no way of knowing how Fair would have adjusted the 
nine variables along with the fact that Central Bonds was attempting to get quotes for 
coverage greater than Fair had expressed an intention to purchase. 
The Harris decision explains why Farr's claims against Central Bonds are fatally 
speculative: 
The nature of the losses here underscores the reason summary judgment 
was appropriate. The most basic business policy includes $5,000 of 
protection for valuable papers. Albrecht only had binding authority up to 
$25,000 for valuable papers, and Harris could not have received such 
coverage without taking loss-reduction measures. It is also possible that 
State Farm would not have bound the policy or that Harris would not have 
insured his valuable papers for as much as he now claims. . . . In light of 
these unknowns, a jury determination of damages would be purely 
speculative. 
Harris, 2004 UT 13, ^ 29 n.2. 
All these Harris factors apply in this case. First, Central Bonds could not, and 
Auto Owners did not, bind a policy for Fair. Indeed, because of Auto Owners' 
reinsurance agreements, Auto Owners could not even write the Spoilage coverage that 
would have applied to Farr's Loss. Travelers would have had to write that coverage, and 
it is undisputed that Travelers did not bind coverage for Fair. Second, there is no 
evidence in the Record that Travelers would have ultimately (or timely, for that matter) 
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written the Spoilage coverage necessary to insure Fair's Loss. Third, given Farr's past 
iiisiitviiii r histni 'i linn i- in i nniprli nil i \ u lnur III.ill I HI (iiiilill li.n i iiisuiul 1 am s S.illl 
Lake building of its inventory for as much as Farr now claims, or the level of deductible 
that i f would have selected. Finally, Mr. Fan* candidly admitted that he purchased 
lii 2003 (and in pi ioi } eai s) based on pi ice I here is no evidence in the Record 
that Central Bonds would have produced the low bid if it had been able to produ 
at all, of that Fair would have accepted a bid that was higher than other bids. 
iise i easons, a jui j determinatior damages would . : mpermissibly 
speculative, and the district court properly disn ••.. " *, l.'i nu ,* * nlial \\\ nn!-. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Ioi the foregoing reasons, this Court should AFFIRM the district court's summary 
judgment dismissing all cl.mns th.il IMII luiuii'hl in i nulil h.i1 i hnmi'hl againsl K iichrn 
Central Bonds & Insurance Agency, Inc. and Central Bonds & Insurance Agency, Inc. 
DATED: IV larch 24, 2008 
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